The “enforcement is expensive” argument is especially insufferable. On top of what you said, I, and almost all Americans, would happily shell out more tax dollars to ensure that the vicious monsters who sell fentanyl to children and crack to addicts get their comeuppance.
Even if it was expensive (which it isn’t necessarily, as you lay out), good things frequently come at a price.
Is it fair to say that this analysis depends on the (key?) premise that any and all "use" is deemed to be zero or negative value to every and all users (and society)?
I can see the case for prohibition even with a "black market problem" if one thinks, say, any/all personal fireworks or any/all sports betting or any/all tobacco use produces zero or negative value to the users and society. Stated differently and perhaps better, the case for prohibition made here makes sense if/when one views all forms of use as net harmful. But doesn't the story get even more complicated if some uses are positive, eg, if some persons garner real benefits from bringing their family/friends together for a firework display and/or an office pool and/or cigars to celebrate a special occasion? In particular, if we worry that prohibition dramatically reduces or eliminates all positive use cases and/or shifts many into negative cases uses --- indeed, arguably the goal of prohibition for the non-addict is to convince the user that the time/energy/risks of accessing illicit market are not worth it --- prohibition my reduce use cases but still represent a net negative policy relative to a regulated market because we have extinguished (many) potential positive use cases.
Perhaps this is what you mean by advocates of legalization "need to show their work." But one's starting premise on the value of a use case would seem to be critical to doing so. Many advocates of marijuana reform view marijuana use as a positive (in itself or relative to use of other drugs and alcohol). Do these advocates get to simply point to an increase in the use of marijuana by, say, people over 50 as "showing their work" because it seems to be a result of legalization trends? Can they go so far as to claim/assert that legalization increases positive use cases not merely due to "better products" but also due to a better/easier experiences in accessing those products? Again, if the key assumption is that all uses are harmful, these issues are readily ignored in the calculus. But I am unsure if this is a given in your analysis.
It's been well established that legalizing prostitution in certain European countries has *increased* demand and increased trafficking. It amazes me that people can't see how this works.
That said, I personally am not super interested in laws against prostitution. It's no good telling dudes they can't do this, they have to want to stop on their own. Who knows if that will ever happen.
As usual, I learn a lot from your posts on this topic, which run contrary to the firm opinions I've carried for many years based on much reading and research. I wish, however, you made more than a passing reference to the costs of the War on Drugs. Putting the United States aside, what about drug gang ("cartel") violence in countries like Colombia and Mexico, which at times threatens state sovereignty? Was that violence unavoidable, or could some form of decriminalization have reduced the profits and other advantages that accrued to militarized smuggling organizations?
1) We know that cartels substitute between prohibited markets—the legalization of marijuana, for example, has driven them into both the fentanyl business and the animal black market. It's not obvious that any given legalization necessarily reduces their power: witness, for example, the way that cartel violence has risen in parallel with marijuana legalization. Similarly, small possession *is* decriminalized in Mexico; it's had no measurable effects (https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5924731/). So we should not just assume that legalization or even decriminalization = less cartel violence.
2) The fundamental source of cartel violence is *weak states in Latin America*. That's something American policy can assist with, but it's just not obvious that we assist by doing massive damage to our population through legalization. Indeed, I don't think harms in nations to our south should outweigh these concerns in American domestic policymaking! Ultimately, it's on other sovereign states to get their houses in order.
My logic really applied to source countries. Following their own national interest, not ours, they might have done better to resist joining our war on drugs. Mexico experienced far less cartel violence when the cocaine trade was regulated through trafficker collaboration with the DFS. Heavy handed enforcement activity driven by US pressure led to the proliferation and militarization of the "cartels." What if countries like Mexico and Colombia had insisted that the United States get its house in order without enlisting them as enforcement agents for a problem driven by North American demand?
It's hard to fully separate cause from effect, but my read is that the explosion of cartel violence was due less to any "war on drugs" and more to other causes. The first was Mexico's change in government in 2000, the first election the PRI had lost in decades, which overturned stable patronage networks all over the country. The second was the growing profits of drug traffickers themselves. Cartel wars in the 90s were perhaps similar in scale to Mafia wars in NYC back in the day. By 2005 or so major cartels could afford small armies, and instead of being controlled by the DFS they could often call the shots themselves.
These responses are both partially true but they don't fully dismiss Jonathon's points. Sure, cartels will switch to other businesses if they have to, but it's clearly a second-best option if they must be forced to do so because of lack of options. For example when the very profitable migrant pipelines dried up in 2025 many local gangs tried to turn to kidnapping locals, but that was riskier and less profitable and eventually those gangs were put out of business by the state.
Also while I'll agree that weak states are a fundamental source of violence, the flames are absolutely fanned and fueled by drug profits. The hitman and lookouts who risk their lives making the violence happen are doing it for a payday, not for fun. Likewise corrupt politicians are weighing risk and reward.
The “enforcement is expensive” argument is especially insufferable. On top of what you said, I, and almost all Americans, would happily shell out more tax dollars to ensure that the vicious monsters who sell fentanyl to children and crack to addicts get their comeuppance.
Even if it was expensive (which it isn’t necessarily, as you lay out), good things frequently come at a price.
Is it fair to say that this analysis depends on the (key?) premise that any and all "use" is deemed to be zero or negative value to every and all users (and society)?
I can see the case for prohibition even with a "black market problem" if one thinks, say, any/all personal fireworks or any/all sports betting or any/all tobacco use produces zero or negative value to the users and society. Stated differently and perhaps better, the case for prohibition made here makes sense if/when one views all forms of use as net harmful. But doesn't the story get even more complicated if some uses are positive, eg, if some persons garner real benefits from bringing their family/friends together for a firework display and/or an office pool and/or cigars to celebrate a special occasion? In particular, if we worry that prohibition dramatically reduces or eliminates all positive use cases and/or shifts many into negative cases uses --- indeed, arguably the goal of prohibition for the non-addict is to convince the user that the time/energy/risks of accessing illicit market are not worth it --- prohibition my reduce use cases but still represent a net negative policy relative to a regulated market because we have extinguished (many) potential positive use cases.
Perhaps this is what you mean by advocates of legalization "need to show their work." But one's starting premise on the value of a use case would seem to be critical to doing so. Many advocates of marijuana reform view marijuana use as a positive (in itself or relative to use of other drugs and alcohol). Do these advocates get to simply point to an increase in the use of marijuana by, say, people over 50 as "showing their work" because it seems to be a result of legalization trends? Can they go so far as to claim/assert that legalization increases positive use cases not merely due to "better products" but also due to a better/easier experiences in accessing those products? Again, if the key assumption is that all uses are harmful, these issues are readily ignored in the calculus. But I am unsure if this is a given in your analysis.
It's been well established that legalizing prostitution in certain European countries has *increased* demand and increased trafficking. It amazes me that people can't see how this works.
That said, I personally am not super interested in laws against prostitution. It's no good telling dudes they can't do this, they have to want to stop on their own. Who knows if that will ever happen.
As usual, I learn a lot from your posts on this topic, which run contrary to the firm opinions I've carried for many years based on much reading and research. I wish, however, you made more than a passing reference to the costs of the War on Drugs. Putting the United States aside, what about drug gang ("cartel") violence in countries like Colombia and Mexico, which at times threatens state sovereignty? Was that violence unavoidable, or could some form of decriminalization have reduced the profits and other advantages that accrued to militarized smuggling organizations?
There are a few responses here.
1) We know that cartels substitute between prohibited markets—the legalization of marijuana, for example, has driven them into both the fentanyl business and the animal black market. It's not obvious that any given legalization necessarily reduces their power: witness, for example, the way that cartel violence has risen in parallel with marijuana legalization. Similarly, small possession *is* decriminalized in Mexico; it's had no measurable effects (https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5924731/). So we should not just assume that legalization or even decriminalization = less cartel violence.
2) The fundamental source of cartel violence is *weak states in Latin America*. That's something American policy can assist with, but it's just not obvious that we assist by doing massive damage to our population through legalization. Indeed, I don't think harms in nations to our south should outweigh these concerns in American domestic policymaking! Ultimately, it's on other sovereign states to get their houses in order.
My logic really applied to source countries. Following their own national interest, not ours, they might have done better to resist joining our war on drugs. Mexico experienced far less cartel violence when the cocaine trade was regulated through trafficker collaboration with the DFS. Heavy handed enforcement activity driven by US pressure led to the proliferation and militarization of the "cartels." What if countries like Mexico and Colombia had insisted that the United States get its house in order without enlisting them as enforcement agents for a problem driven by North American demand?
It's hard to fully separate cause from effect, but my read is that the explosion of cartel violence was due less to any "war on drugs" and more to other causes. The first was Mexico's change in government in 2000, the first election the PRI had lost in decades, which overturned stable patronage networks all over the country. The second was the growing profits of drug traffickers themselves. Cartel wars in the 90s were perhaps similar in scale to Mafia wars in NYC back in the day. By 2005 or so major cartels could afford small armies, and instead of being controlled by the DFS they could often call the shots themselves.
These responses are both partially true but they don't fully dismiss Jonathon's points. Sure, cartels will switch to other businesses if they have to, but it's clearly a second-best option if they must be forced to do so because of lack of options. For example when the very profitable migrant pipelines dried up in 2025 many local gangs tried to turn to kidnapping locals, but that was riskier and less profitable and eventually those gangs were put out of business by the state.
Also while I'll agree that weak states are a fundamental source of violence, the flames are absolutely fanned and fueled by drug profits. The hitman and lookouts who risk their lives making the violence happen are doing it for a payday, not for fun. Likewise corrupt politicians are weighing risk and reward.